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ABSTRACT
Using data from a large cross-section of British establishments, we ask
how different firm characteristics are associated with the predicted benefits
to organizational performance from using team production. To compute
the predicted benefits from using team production, we estimate structural
models for financial performance, labor productivity, and product quality,
treating the firm’s choices of whether or not to use teams and whether or
not to grant teams autonomy as endogenous. One of the main results is
that many firm characteristics are associated with larger predicted benefits
from teams to labor productivity and product quality but smaller predicted
benefits to financial performance. For example, this is true for union rec-
ognition as measured by the number of recognized unions in an establish-
ment. Similarly, when a particular firm characteristic is associated with
lower benefits from teams to labor productivity or product quality, the
same characteristic is frequently associated with higher predicted benefits
to financial performance. This is true for the degree of financial partic-
ipation and employee ownership and also for establishment size and a
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number of industries. These results highlight the advantages of analyzing
broader measures of organizational performance that are more inclusive of
the wide spectrum of benefits and costs associated with teams than the
labor productivity measures frequently studied in the teams literature.
1. INTRODUCTION
Arguments suggesting that innovative systems for organizing and managing
employees generate improved employee achievement and organizational per-
formance abound. Recent research on workplace practices transferring power
to employees, described collectively as ‘‘high-performance practices,’’ has iden-
tified employee participation as a key element of sustained competitive advan-
tage. Employee participation in the form of team-based work structures, often
‘‘self-managed teams’’ conferred with considerable autonomy, figures prom-
inently as one dimension of high-performance work systems and is the focus of
this paper. Specifically, our goal is to shed light on the question of what types
of organizations benefit from team production and how they benefit (e.g.,
through higher financial performance, labor productivity, or product quality).
Much of the vast literature on teams and other high-performance prac-
tices focuses on the question of whether and how organizations benefit from
use of these practices, as opposed to the question of what types of organ-
izations benefit. A popular approach is the case study, examining one or a
relatively small number of firms, usually over time (e.g., Bartel, 2004; Batt,
1999, 2001, 2004; Hamilton, Nickerson, & Owan, 2003; Batt & Appelbaum,
1995). While the case study approach is useful for answering questions
about whether and how organizations benefit from teams, it is somewhat
less useful for answering questions about what types of organizations ben-
efit, since by their very nature case studies involve little or no variation in
firm characteristics. Introducing variation in firm characteristics usually re-
quires comparisons of different case studies, as in meta analyses.1 The dif-
ficulty with this approach is that studies vary widely in their data,
measurement of variables, methodology, sampling period, geographic re-
gion of analysis, research questions, and in a variety of other respects. If the
goal is to identify how a particular firm characteristic, say firm size, is
associated with the predicted benefits to organizational performance from
using teams, this question is unlikely to be answered convincingly through
comparisons across case studies. Such a task would involve assembling a
relatively small number of case studies that vary by the size of the organ-
izations studied; inevitably these organizations will vary in a multitude of
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dimensions other than the firm size, making it impossible to control for
these other factors. Even if it were possible to make controlled comparisons,
it would not be clear what weights should be assigned to the individual
studies being surveyed.
An alternative to the case study approach, and the one taken in this
paper, is the use of broader cross-sections or panels of organizations. Ex-
amples of studies taking this approach include Black and Lynch (2001,
2004), DeVaro (2004a, b), Eriksson (2003), Kato and Morishima (2002),
Cappelli and Neumark (2001), and Caroli and van Reenen (2001). Like case
studies, broader samples of firms can shed light on the question of whether
and how organizations benefit from teams. In addition, these data are
somewhat more conducive to answering questions about what types of or-
ganizations benefit from teams, due to their inherent variation across or-
ganizational types. Of course, these broader data sets suffer a number of
disadvantages relative to case studies. First, since the samples are more
heterogeneous, the definitions of variables (for instance, the meaning of
‘‘team production’’) are not as obviously comparable as they would be
across observations in a single case study. Second, significant heterogeneity
in these samples increases the threat that unobserved heterogeneity may bias
the estimated effect of teams on organizational performance. Other things
equal, panel data are always preferable to cross sectional data in that they
can accommodate individual effects to mitigate concerns about unobserved
heterogeneity. However, exploiting such panel data in studies of team pro-
duction invariably involves compromising either on the breadth of the
sample or on the richness of the information available in the data or both.
Our study uses a large, nationally representative cross section of British
establishments in 1998. Our sample has variation not only in whether or not
team production is used, but on the type of team production used, in par-
ticular whether or not team members are granted autonomy. In addition to
detailed firm characteristics for use as controls, the sample also includes
multiple measures of organizational performance (financial performance,
labor productivity, and product quality). To our knowledge, there are no
large, nationally representative panel data sets available that contain infor-
mation on the types of teams used (autonomous or non-autonomous), firm
characteristics, and multiple measures of organizational performance. Our
research strategy is therefore to exploit the unique and extensive informa-
tion contained in our cross-sectional data, while estimating structural mod-
els to address concerns about unobserved heterogeneity biases.
There are three main distinguishing features of our work. First, we es-
timate structural models that treat the choices of team production and
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whether to grant teams autonomy as endogenous variables, as opposed to
the typical approach that treats these variables as exogenous right-hand-side
variables in a regression. Second, our models interact the ‘‘teams’’ treatment
with all other firm characteristics (both observed and unobserved). Allowing
the teams treatment effect to vary with organizational characteristics allows
us to make statements about what types of organizations are predicted to
benefit from team production.
Third, we compare three measures of organizational performance (finan-
cial performance, labor productivity, and product quality) in the same
analysis, allowing us to make statements about how teams benefit organ-
izational performance. Though there are some exceptions, such as DeVaro
(2004a) and Huselid (1995), financial performance is rarely seen as the out-
come measure in studies of the effects of high-performance practices on
organizational performance. This variable is of particular interest as an
overall measure of firm performance, since as a measure of profit it is more
inclusive than other outcome measures of the wide array of benefits and
costs associated with human resource practices.2
There are three stages to our empirical analysis. In the first stage, we
estimate structural models for our three measures of organizational per-
formance. In the second stage, we use the parameter estimates from the first
stage to compute the ‘‘predicted benefit to organizational performance from
using team production’’ for each establishment in our sample. In the third
stage, we assess how a particular firm characteristic is associated with the
predicted benefits to organizational performance from using team produc-
tion, holding other firm characteristics constant.
A progressive example is useful for motivating our structural approach.
Consider the following two regressions, where Y is a continuous measure of
firm performance, TEAMS is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm uses
team production and 0 otherwise, X is a firm characteristic such as firm size,
and e a disturbance term uncorrelated with TEAMS and firm size:
Y ¼ b0 þ b1 TEAMS þ b2X þ  (1)
Y ¼ b0 þ b1 TEAMS þ b2X þ b3 TEAMS Xð Þ þ  (2)
(In practice, of course, X would be a vector containing many character-
istics other than firm size.) If the goal is to ask what the effect of teams is on
firm performance, either regression would be informative. The teams ‘‘treat-
ment effect’’ of interest would be b1 in Model 1 and b1+b3X in Model 2. If,
on the other hand, the goal is to ask (as in this paper) whether the benefits
from teams are greater in larger firms than in smaller firms or vice versa,
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only Model 2 is informative. If the estimated b3 is found to be negative, we
would conclude that the benefits to organizational performance from using
teams decrease with firm size. In sum, Model 2 provides a simple way of
answering our research question of what types of firms (or in this example
what size firms) benefit from team production.
Model 2 assumes that the unobserved determinants of firm performance
are the same whether team production is used or not. Allowing these un-
observed determinants of firm performance to differ by whether or not
teams are used, or interacting TEAMS with e, yields the following gener-
alization of Model 2:
Y ¼ b0 þ b1X þ 1 ifTEAMS ¼ 1
¼ b2 þ b3X þ 0 ifTEAMS ¼ 0 ð3Þ
The teams treatment effect in Model 3 is (b0 – b2)+(b1 – b3)X. This is
computationally identical to the teams treatment effect in Model 2. Models
1–3 can be criticized on the grounds that they assume that the disturbances
are uncorrelated with TEAMS, a case that is quite difficult to make. Even if
X were to include a detailed set of observable firm characteristics, there
would inevitably be some inherently unobservable factors (such as mana-
gerial talent or the degree of congeniality and cooperation among the
workers) that would influence both firm performance and the tendency of
the firm to engage in team production. The consequence is that in all three
regressions the estimated teams treatment effect is biased, yielding mislead-
ing answers to the question of whether firms benefit from team production
and to the question of whether large firms experience different benefits from
teams than do small firms.
To address this endogeneity problem, one can specify an additional
equation that determines TEAMS. Letting TEAMS* denote a continuous
latent index that can be thought of as the firm’s propensity to engage in team
production, consider the following Model 4:
Y ¼ b0 þ b1X þ 1 ifTEAMS ¼ 1
¼ b2 þ b3X þ 0 ifTEAMS ¼ 0
TEAMSn ¼ a0 þ a1Z þ 2
TEAMS ¼ 1 if TEAMSn40
¼ 0 if TEAMSn  0 ð4Þ
Assuming multivariate normality of the disturbances, estimation of this
model yields consistent estimates of the teams’ treatment effect of interest.
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Whereas in Model 3 we incorrectly imposed (implicitly) the assumptions
covð1; 2Þ ¼ 0 and covð0; 2Þ ¼ 0; in Model 4 these covariances are unre-
stricted parameters to be estimated.
The structural models we estimate in this paper are only slightly more
complicated than Model 4, the two main differences being that our measures
of Y are discrete rather than continuous and that we introduce autonomy
into the model and treat it as endogenous in addition to teams. These
models were proposed and estimated in a pair of recent related papers
(DeVaro, 2004a, b). The first of these considered financial performance
(interpreted as profit) as the measure of organizational performance, and
the second considered labor productivity and product quality. Both papers
addressed the question of whether the team production affects organiza-
tional performance but did not consider how these effects differ in different
types of firms. In the present paper, we consider all the three measures of
organizational performance and ask how the predicted benefits of teams
vary with organizational characteristics. We now turn to a discussion of the
theoretical background underlying teams research and previous evidence on
what types of organizations are most likely to benefit from team structures.
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON FIRM
CHARACTERISTICS AND THE BENEFITS OF TEAMS
TO ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Theoretical models in the economics literature on the effects of team pro-
duction on organizational performance involve a comparison of the benefits
and costs to team production (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Some of the main
benefits of team production accrue through productive information sharing
among workers, when potential team members have knowledge that is non-
duplicative and also relevant to the production process (Lazear, 1995, 1998).
The potential costs of team production include costs associated with regular
team meetings and training, and shirking and free-riding among team
members (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1982; Rasmusen, 1987;
Itoh, 1991, 1992; McAfee & McMillan, 1991; Legros & Matthews, 1993).
Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue that teams alleviate costly monitoring of
workers in the presence of asymmetric information by relying on monitoring
of workers through peer pressure.
In empirical work, team structures are sometimes the central focus of the
analysis (e.g., DeVaro, 2004a,b; Hamilton et al., 2003; Boning, Ichniowski, &
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Shaw, 2003) and are sometimes one of a number of high performance prac-
tices that are analyzed together (e.g., Eriksson, 2003; Black & Lynch, 2001;
Ichniowski, Shaw, & Prennushi, 1997). Frequently the teams under study are
self-managed or autonomous, reflecting the fact that such teams are used
more commonly than closely managed or non-autonomous teams.3 A com-
mon finding in the literature is that autonomous teams have positive effects
on firm performance. For example, Eriksson (2003) finds a positive effect of
self-managed teams on labor productivity in a cross section of establishments,
and Hamilton et al. (2003) finds a 14% increase in labor productivity after the
introduction of self-managed teams in a garment manufacturing plant.
2.1. What Types of Organizations Benefit from Team Production?
While much has been written on the subject of whether and how teams
confer benefits to organizational performance, less attention has been de-
voted to the question of what types of organizations benefit from teams. Our
analysis addresses a large number of organizational characteristics, but the
following four are of particular interest: union membership, firm size, fi-
nancial participation and employee ownership, and industry. We now dis-
cuss what the previous literature has to say about the relationship between
teams and each of these in turn.
2.2. Union Membership
While some argue that the presence of unions at the workplace constrains
the ability of management to redesign jobs to incorporate new work systems
such as teams, others claim that unions can promote the introduction and
continued existence of such systems by facilitating increased dialogue be-
tween workers and management. A meta-analysis conducted by Doucouli-
agos and Laroche (2003) concluded that unions have a negative impact
overall on labor productivity in the United Kingdom.4 Empirical evidence in
the previous literature on the relation between the presence of unions and
teams has been mixed. Osterman (1994) found that the presence of unions in
an organization is not an important determinant of the adoption of high-
performance workplace practices, including self-managed teams, whereas
McNabb and Whitfield (1997) found that recognized unions facilitate the
introduction of teamwork in establishments.
Apart from this issue of adoption of teams, the question of whether the
benefits to firm performance from using teams vary with the presence of
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unions has been addressed by Black and Lynch (2004). That study found that
when union membership and self-managed teams are interacted in a cross
section regression, the effect on labor productivity is negative, suggesting that
unionized establishments that use self-managed teams tend to have lower
labor productivity. When union membership and self-managed teams are in-
teracted in a fixed effects regression, the effect on labor productivity is pos-
itive. However, neither of these results was statistically significant. McNabb
and Whitfield (1997) used cross sectional data from the third wave of the
Worker Industrial Relations Survey (the wave previous to the one used in the
current paper) to show that the joint effect of union presence and teamwork
on relative financial performance is positive. Our findings are closer to Black
and Lynch’s cross-sectional results in that ours suggest negative relationships
between financial performance and both the presence of unions in the estab-
lishment and the number of recognized unions in the establishment.
2.3. Firm Size
To our knowledge, there has been no work done on the relationship between
firm size and the predicted benefits from team production, though some
attention has been devoted to the question of how the adoption of team
production varies with firm size. For example, Osterman (1994) used data
on 694 manufacturing establishments in the U.S. to find that smaller es-
tablishments are more likely to adopt innovative work practices including
teams. McNabb and Whitfield (1997), on the other hand, found that the
propensity to adopt teamwork programs is positively associated with firm
size and being part of a large organization. The question of whether the
benefits from team production vary by firm size is of interest if for no other
reason than the fact that most labor market measures vary with firm size.
One story that could give rise to a firm-size effect concerns the relative costs
of alternative means of monitoring workers. It might be that in smaller
organizations, internal monitoring by peers in the context of teams is more
effective than in larger organizations. An alternative story that would sug-
gest the opposite result is that larger organizations face greater problems of
coordination and information sharing than do smaller organizations, so that
the benefits from teams would be increasing in the scale of the organization.
2.4. Financial Participation and Employee Ownership
In our study, worker participation in firm decision-making is considered at
the group level and is reflected in the granting of autonomy to team members
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(giving team members the latitude to jointly decide how the work is to be
done). Since over half of the teams in our sample are autonomous by this
definition, the decision to organize production in teams very often coincides
with a decision to increase the degree of worker participation in firm decision
making at the group level. Recent research has shown that such employee
involvement in decision making is an effective means of enhancing firm
performance when implemented along with employee ownership schemes
such as profit sharing and share ownership (Kruse et al., 2004; Kruse, 2002;
Freeman & Dube, 2000; Kruse & Blasi, 1997; Ichniowski et al., 1997;
Ben-Ner & Jones, 1995). Eriksson (2003) argued that new work practices
and new pay practices such as teams bonus, individual bonus, stock or stock
options, and profit sharing are complementary in the sense that, if a firm
that has adopted new work practices introduces performance-related pay
schemes, this enhances productivity further, though this complementarity is
found to be more on the level of individual compensation schemes, rather
than group-based pay incentives. Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) argued that
both ownership without participation, and participation without ownership,
can actually decrease firm performance by increasing worker–firm conflict.
Adams (2003) found the existence of complementarities between the use of
profit sharing and the delegation of decision-making power on an individual
basis to production line workers.
Other studies have argued that financial participation is conducive to
aligning the goals of the employees with the goals of the firm by directly
linking the workers’ pay to firm performance. However, the goal-alignment
process needs to be supported both by financial participation and employee
ownership, or what is called ‘‘direct participation,’’ and employee involve-
ment in decision making at all levels of the firm hierarchy, or what is called
‘‘indirect participation’’ (Kato & Morishima, 2002). Kruse (2002) has ex-
plained the intuition as follows: ‘‘Employee ownership may improve firm
performance by decreasing labor-management conflict and serving as a col-
lective incentive to improve workplace cooperation, information-sharing,
and organizational citizenship behavior. This may be limited by the free-
rider problem when rewards are shared with co-workers, direct incentives for
better work becomes weak as the number of coworkers expands. To coun-
teract this problem and encourage higher performance, firms may combine
employee ownership with employee participation in decision-making and
other human resource policies to encourage a sense of ownership, draw more
fully on worker skills and information, and create company spirit and work
norms.’’ (p. 71). In this paper, we present evidence corroborating this com-
plementarity hypothesis; our analysis shows that establishments whose
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employees engage in higher levels of financial participation are also more
likely to benefit from team production through higher financial performance.
2.5. Industry
According to the cross sectional analysis of McNabb and Whitfield (1997),
the presence of teamwork programs is most common in the wholesale and
retail sectors, and least likely in production industries and non-metal man-
ufacture, whereas establishments in banking, insurance, and finance are
generally more likely to adopt teams. Empirical statements about which
industries experience the largest predicted benefits from teams and other
workplace practices must be made primarily on the basis of comparisons of
different case studies or different industry-specific data sets. The vast ma-
jority of past studies have focused on the manufacturing industry. Com-
paratively less is known about the effects of teams on firm performance in
other industries, though there are some results. In services, an example is
Batt (1999), which found that the use of self-managed teams among cus-
tomer service and sales workers yields a statistically significant improvement
in self-reported service quality and sales per employee (the measure of labor
productivity in sales occupations). When combined with new technology
usage, teams boost sales by an even greater magnitude. Batt and Appelbaum
(1995) looked at two industries, namely telecommunications (where they
considered customer service staff as well as ‘‘network crafts’’ occupations
such as installation and repair crews) and apparel manufacturing (where
they considered sewing machine operators) and found that teams have a
significant and positive impact on workers’ perceptions of the quality of
work done by their work groups.5 Batt’s (2001) empirical results suggest
that there are no significant differences in labor productivity and service
quality when field technicians work in teams rather than independently.
In manufacturing, the effect of teams and other high-performance work
practices has generally been found to be positive. Hamilton et al. (2003)
found a 14% increase in labor productivity after a switch to self-managed
teams in a garment-manufacturing plant in Northern California. Also in the
apparel manufacturing industry, Berg, Appelbaum, Bailey, and Kalleberg
(1996) found that team production improved such outcomes as quality,
costs, and responsiveness to retailers via better coordination among team
members as a result of their ability to self-regulate work, eliminate bottle-
necks, resolve conflicts, help one another to solve problems, and make im-
provements to the production process.
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Boning et al. (2003) used data from the steel-manufacturing sector to find
that production lines that adopt problem-solving teams experience large gains
in productivity. However, this is true only for production lines that undertake
complex production processes and products – in less complex environments,
there is no benefit to using teams. Ichniowski et al. (1997) studied the effects
of high-performance workplace systems in a specific production process in
steel manufacturing, namely steel finishing lines. They considered teams
(specifically the existence and prevalence of formal work teams for the pur-
poses of problem-solving activities, and worker membership in multiple
problem-solving teams) as one of a number of human resource management
(HRM) practices used, though their focus was on HRM systems more gen-
erally rather than teams specifically. Their results indicate that finishing lines,
which utilize a set of innovative work practices have higher levels of worker
productivity than lines that use more traditional practices and that there exist
complementarities between certain high-performance practices.
Black and Lynch (2001) found that U.S. firms in manufacturing that use
high-performance workplace practices, such as regular group meetings, bench-
marking, self-managed teams and profit sharing have higher productivity and
wages than other firms. Black and Lynch (2004) suggested that the adoption
of such innovations was an important factor contributing to the jump in
multifactor productivity of the U.S. economy in the second half of the 1990s.
On the other hand, Cappelli and Neumark (2001) studied the effects of high-
performance work practices including benchmarking, regularly scheduled
group meetings to discuss work-related problems, job rotation, self-managed
teams, pay for skill and profit sharing in a panel of manufacturing firms. Their
results show that these practices may raise productivity, though with little
statistical significance, and that the effects on overall labor efficiency are small.
3. DATA: WORKPLACE EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
SURVEY (WERS) 1998
The data are from the management questionnaire in the 1998 wave of the
British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) (Department of
Trade and Industry and Advisory, 2001), jointly sponsored by the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry, ACAS, the Economic and Social Research
Council, and the Policy Studies Institute. Distributed via the UK Data Ar-
chive, the WERS data are a nationally representative stratified random sample
covering British workplaces with at least 10 employees except for those in the
following 1992 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) divisions: agriculture,
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hunting, and forestry; fishing; mining and quarrying; private households with
employed persons; and extra-territorial organizations. Some of the 3,192
workplaces targeted were found to be out of scope, and the final sample size of
2,191 implies a net response rate of 80.4% (Cully, Woodland, O’Reilly, & Dix,
1999) after excluding out-of-scope cases. Data were collected between October
1997 and June 1998 via face-to-face interviews, and the respondent was usu-
ally the most senior manager at the workplace with responsibility for em-
ployment relations. Table 1 displays the industry composition of the sample,
using 12 industry categories in the 1992 SIC.
Table 1. Distribution of Workplaces by Industry and Largest
Occupational Group.
Number of
Establishments
Percent of Total
Distribution by industry
Manufacturing 299 13.7
Electricity, gas, and water 80 3.7
Construction 112 5.1
Wholesale and retail 322 14.7
Hotels and restaurants 127 5.8
Transport and communication 136 6.2
Financial services 101 4.6
Other business services 227 10.4
Public administration 183 8.4
Education 244 11.1
Health 249 11.4
Other community services 111 5.1
Total 2191 100
Distribution by largest occupational group at workplace
Managers and administrators 15 0.7
Professional occupations 309 14.1
Associate professional and technical occupations 180 8.2
Clerical & secretarial occupations 390 17.8
Craft & related occupations 231 10.5
Personal and protective service occupations 314 14.3
Sales occupations 237 10.8
Plant and machine operatives 278 12.7
Other occupations 237 10.8
Total 2191 100
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Our measures of organizational performance are discrete responses to
three survey questions concerning the establishment’s current financial per-
formance, labor productivity, and quality of product or service, relative to
other establishments in the same industry. Responses include: ‘‘A lot better
than average’’, ‘‘Better than average’’, ‘‘About average for industry’’, ‘‘Be-
low average’’, ‘‘A lot below average’’, and ‘‘No comparison possible’’. Few
establishments report below-average performance for any of the three meas-
ures. While this might indicate reporting error in the dependent variables,
such errors need not have consequences for our analysis unless a respond-
ent’s likelihood of overstating performance is systematically related to the
choices of teams and autonomy.6 Furthermore, an establishment’s inclusion
in the sample is conditional on its being operational, and length-biased
sampling arises when operational establishments are sampled at a point in
time. High-performing establishments have long durations of operation and
are more likely to be sampled than low-performing establishments with low
durations of operation. The pronounced asymmetry in reported perform-
ance that is observed in the data is therefore not surprising.7
The 1998 wave of the WERS includes a follow-up question asking re-
spondents their interpretation of the term ‘‘financial performance’’. The
frequency of responses is as follows:8
Interpretation of ‘‘financial performance’’ Number of
Firms
% of Firms
Profit or value added 952 52.9
Sales, fees, budget 374 20.7
Costs or expenditure 389 21.6
Stock market indicators (e.g., share price) 54 3.0
Other specific answer 31 1.7
Total 1,800 100.0
Studies using earlier waves of these data did not have access to this fol-
low-up question and were forced to pool disparate interpretations of the
dependent variable in the same analysis (Machin & Stewart, 1990, 1996;
McNabb & Whitfield, 1997). As shown in DeVaro (2004a), the estimated
effect of teams on financial performance is very sensitive to the interpre-
tation of financial performance. When estimating the model for financial
performance, we use only those establishments interpreting financial per-
formance as profit or value added.
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A skeptic might argue that the three subjective measures of organizational
performance are measuring essentially the same thing. If that were the case,
we would expect extremely high correlations among the three measures.
This is not so, as revealed by the following correlation matrix:
Correlation Matrix for the Measures of Organizational Performance.
Financial
Performance
Labor
Productivity
Product
Quality
Financial performance 1.000
Labor productivity 0.507 1.000
Product quality 0.328 0.352 1.000
The correlations are all positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level, but their average value is only 0.40.
For each establishment, the data contain information about the proportion
of employees in the largest occupational group that works in formally desig-
nated teams. Responses are in the following discrete categories: ‘‘All 100%’’,
‘‘Almost all 80–99%’’, ‘‘Most 60–79%’’, ‘‘Around half 40–59%’’, ‘‘Some
20–39%’’, ‘‘Just a few 1–19%’’, ‘‘None 0%’’. An advantage of this survey
question is that it specifically refers to ‘‘formally designated’’ teams. This precise
wording of the question directs the respondent’s attention to situations of true
joint production and should reduce the respondent’s likelihood of reporting the
use of teamwork simply on the basis of a cooperative or friendly atmosphere of
‘‘team spirit’’ at the workplace. A drawback of the survey question is that it is
restricted to the largest occupational group at the establishment. The sample
may contain establishments in which team production is heavily used in oc-
cupational groups other than the largest, yet the response to this question might
be ‘‘None 0%’’. This measurement issue is one limitation of the study.
The survey also contains a measure of team autonomy that corresponds
well to the notions of autonomy discussed in the theoretical literatures of
economics and organizational behavior (Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Hackman,
1987).9 For establishments that report the use of formally designated teams
in the largest occupational group, the respondent manager is asked to re-
spond ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No’’ to the following statement: ‘‘Team members jointly
decide how the work is to be done.’’ Since both the team and autonomy
variables are defined in terms of the establishment’s largest occupational
group, we provide the distribution of the sample by largest occupational
group in the lower panel of Table 1. All observations in the WERS are
coded according to the UK Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys
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Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes, and we aggregated these
to produce nine one-digit categories.
4. METHODOLOGY
There are three stages to our methodology. First, we estimate structural
models for each of our three measures of organizational performance (fi-
nancial performance, labor productivity, and product quality). Second, we
use the estimated parameters from the first stage to compute for each es-
tablishment in the sample a ‘‘predicted benefit to organizational perform-
ance from using team production’’. These first two stages closely follow
DeVaro (2004a,b), so our treatment here is brief, and we relegate the tech-
nical details to the appendix. Third, we ask how the ‘‘predicted benefit’’
computed in our second stage varies as a function of the firm characteristics
in the model. This sheds light on what types of firms are likely to benefit
from team production and in what areas (financial performance, labor pro-
ductivity, and product quality) they are likely to benefit.
4.1. Stage 1: Estimating Structural Models of Teams, Autonomy, and
Organizational Performance
The model has the same structure for each measure of organizational per-
formance. Since the three endogenous variables (organizational performance,
teams, and autonomy) in each model are observed as discrete responses, the
structural model specifies probabilities for all possible outcomes. To make the
analysis tractable, some aggregation is needed to reduce the number of out-
comes. Since relatively few respondents report below-average performance,
we aggregate the lowest three categories for each of the organizational per-
formance measures as follows: 1 ¼ ‘‘About average for industry’’ or below;
2 ¼ ‘‘Better than average’’; 3 ¼ ‘‘A lot better than average’’. Furthermore, we
consider only whether team production is used or not in the largest occu-
pational group, rather than focusing on the fraction of that group that en-
gages in team production. That is, we aggregate the teams variable as follows:
TEAMS ¼ 1 if positive fraction of workers in the largest
occupational group is in teams
¼ 0 otherwise
The sequence of the model is as follows. First, the establishment decides
whether or not to use teams (TEAMS ¼ 0 or 1). Given that teams are
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chosen, the establishment then decides whether to grant the teams auton-
omy (AUTO ¼ 0 or 1). Finally, these choices of teams and autonomy
affect organizational performance. Let Yi
* denote a latent indicator of or-
ganizational performance for the ith establishment, relative to the industry
average, and let Yi denote its ordered, discrete realization, taking values of
1, 2, or 3. The four-equation structural model has the following form:
Yin ¼ aAUTOi þ X1id1 þ 1i if TEAMSi ¼ 1
¼ X1id2 þ 0i if TEAMSi ¼ 0
TEAMSin ¼ X2ibþ 2i
AUTOin ¼ X3icþ 3i if TEAMSi ¼ 1
Yi ¼ 1 ifY nio0
¼ 2 if0  Y nioc where c40
¼ 3 ifY ni  c
TEAMSi ¼ 1 if TEAMSin40
¼ 0 otherwise
AUTOi ¼ 1 if AUTOin40 and TEAMSin40
¼ 0 if AUTOin  0 and TEAMSin40
We assume multivariate normality of the disturbances, ð0; 1; 2; 3Þ 
Nð0; RÞ; and estimate the four equations jointly by maximum likelihood.
The vector of parameters to be estimated, h, includes a, d1, d2, c, b, c, s02,
s12, s13, and s23, where the notation sij means cov(ei, ej).
By treating organizational performance as a switching regression, we al-
low for a full set of interactions between teams and all observed and un-
observed determinants of performance. Autonomy, on the other hand,
enters only as a dummy-endogenous variable on the right-hand-side of the
organizational performance equation when teams are used. In principle, it
would be possible to allow for a full set of interactions of autonomy with the
determinants of performance, but that analysis would not be feasible with
our sample size.10
4.2. Stage 2: Constructing Predicted Benefits of Teams to
Organizational Performance
The estimation results from Stage 1 allow us to construct measures of the
‘‘predicted benefits from using teams’’ for each establishment in the sample.
Recall that the measures of organizational performance assume values of
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1, 2, or 3 according to whether the establishment’s recent performance rel-
ative to that of others in the industry is average or below, better than average,
or a lot better than average. The effect of teams on organizational perform-
ance is the change in the probabilities that performance is in each of these
three categories when team production is used in the largest occupational
group compared to when it is not used. Letting Yi denote the discrete meas-
ure of organizational performance (taking values 1 ¼ ‘‘average or below’’,
2 ¼ ‘‘above average’’, 3 ¼ ‘‘a lot above average’’), the following three meas-
ures give the effect of team production on performance for establishment i:11
EffectA1ð Þi ¼ Prob Yi ¼ 1jTEAMSi ¼ 1ð Þ  Prob Yi ¼ 1jTEAMSi ¼ 0ð Þ
EffectA2ð Þi ¼ Prob Yi ¼ 2jTEAMSi ¼ 1ð Þ  Prob Yi ¼ 2jTEAMSi ¼ 0ð Þ
EffectA3ð Þi ¼ Prob Yi ¼ 3jTEAMSi ¼ 1ð Þ  Prob Yi ¼ 3jTEAMSi ¼ 0ð Þ
Since for an individual establishment these three effects must sum to 0, any
two of them contain all of the information about the effect of team pro-
duction on that establishment’s performance. We therefore focus on Effects
A1 and A3.
4.3. Stage 3: How Do the Predicted Benefits from Teams Vary with
Firm Characteristics?
We next ask how the predicted benefit from using team production that we
compute in Stage 2 varies as a function of the covariates in the model. That
is, we are interested in seeing how the functions EffectA3 and EffectA1 vary
with changes in a particular firm characteristic, holding the other firm
characteristics constant. We do this computation slightly differently ac-
cording to whether the covariate in question is a single dummy variable, one
dummy variable from a group of related dummies, or a ‘‘continuous’’ var-
iable.12 When the covariate of interest is a dummy variable, X, we compute
ðEffectA3jX ¼ 1Þ  ðEffectA3jX ¼ 0Þ for each workplace, evaluating each
of the other covariates at their actual establishment values. Then we take the
average of these differences across all workplaces in the sample to obtain a
summary measure of how EffectA3 varies with changes in X. We follow the
analogous approach for EffectA1. If the particular X is one dummy in a
group of related dummies the computation is the same as the one just
described, except that the other dummies in the same group are evaluated at
0 rather than at their observed values for each workplace. The three groups
of dummies that are considered in this way are the industry, occupation, and
ownership variables. The reference group for each of these categories is the
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wholesale and retail industry, clerical and secretarial occupations, and pub-
lic sector workplaces. Finally, when the covariate of interest is ‘‘continu-
ous’’, the differences we compute are not between X ¼ 1 and X ¼ 0 but
rather between the 0.75 and 0.25 quantile of X, again evaluating all of the
other covariates at their individual values for each workplace.
More precisely, consider the following definitions:
xji  covariate j for establishment i
xkaj;i  vector of covariates for establishment i excluding covariate xji
xkaj;i  vector of covariates for establishment i excluding covariate xji
when xji is one dummy variable in a multiple-dummy group,
setting to 0 all other dummies in the multiple-dummy group to
which xji belongs
x
q
j  quantile q of covariate xj
Then the following expressions illustrate how EffectsA3 and A1 change, on
average, with a particular covariate xj:
Case 1: xj is binary but not part of a multiple-dummy group
DEffectA3 ¼ 1
N
 XN
i¼1
EffectA3 xji ¼ 1;xkaj;i
  EffectA3 xji ¼ 0;xkaj;i  
DEffectA1 ¼ 1
N
 XN
i¼1
EffectA1 xji ¼ 1;xkaj;i
  EffectA1 xji ¼ 0;xkaj;i  
Case 2: xj is binary and part of a multiple-dummy group (i.e., industry,
occupation, ownership)
DEffectA3 ¼ 1
N
 XN
i¼1
EffectA3 xji ¼ 1; xkaj;i
h i
 EffectA3 xji ¼ 0;xkaj;i
h i 
DEffectA1 ¼ 1
N
 XN
i¼1
EffectA1 xji ¼ 1; xkaj;i
h i
 EffectA1 xji ¼ 0;xkaj;i
h i 
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Case 3: xj is continuous
DEffectA3 ¼ 1
N
 XN
i¼1
EffectA3 xji ¼ x0:75j ; xkaj;i
h i
 EffectA3 xji ¼ x0:25j ; xkaj;i
h i 
DEffectA1 ¼ 1
N
 XN
i¼1
EffectA1 xji ¼ x0:75j ; xkaj;i
h i
 EffectA1 xji ¼ x0:25j ; xkaj;i
h i 
The preceding definitions refer to the quantiles 0.25 and 0.75. Note, however,
that the estimation samples differ for the three measures of organizational
performance (N ¼ 889 for financial performance, N ¼ 1; 660 for labor pro-
ductivity, N ¼ 1; 839 for product quality) and therefore the quantiles may
differ as well. Since most of the covariates are binary, however, the quantiles
of interest are frequently identical across the three estimation samples. The
only exceptions are establishment size, number of part time workers, financial
participation, multi-skilling, and number of recognized unions, and for these
variables the quantiles differ only slightly across the three samples. For con-
sistency, we define all quantiles using the largest sample of the three, namely
the product quality sample. We also tried estimating all three models on the
smallest sample of 889 observations, so that the quantiles exactly coincided
for each model, and the results were similar to those we report here. Our
preference, however, is to report results based on the largest estimation sam-
ple possible for each of the three measures of organizational performance.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 2 displays means and standard deviations of the variables in the
model. We present the parameter estimates from the structural models
(Stage 1 of our three-stage methodology outlined in the previous section) in
Appendix Tables A1–A3. Since the structural models are non-linear, these
parameter estimates lack straightforward interpretations. For our purposes,
they are useful mainly for computing EffectsA3 and A1 in Stage 2 for each
of the three measures of organizational performance. The difference be-
tween EffectA3 and EffectA1 provides a univariate index of the predicted
benefits of team production on organizational performance and facilitates a
simple presentation of the distributions of these benefits.13 Figs. 1–3 display
kernel density estimates of (EffectA3 EffectA1) for financial performance,
labor productivity, and product quality. These distributions have a slight
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations.
Mean Standard Deviation
Dependent variables
Financial performance 1.801 0.728
Labor productivity 1.632 0.681
Product quality 1.942 0.701
Teams 0.870 0.337
Autonomy 0.554 0.497
General firm characteristics
Single-establishment firm 0.217 0.412
Establishment size 294.308 857.423
Fraction of part time workers 0.258 0.280
Temporary workers 0.380 0.486
Fixed term workers under one year 0.439 0.496
Fixed term workers over one year 0.241 0.428
Union workers 0.659 0.474
Financial participation 0.633 0.482
Owner manager 0.096 0.294
Foreign owned 0.104 0.305
Operation over five years 0.890 0.313
Multi-skilling 3.000 1.852
Number of recognized unions 1.538 2.006
Induction training 0.844 0.363
Off-site training 3.941 2.040
Just-in-time production 0.296 0.457
Information 2.729 1.086
Incentive alignment 2.310 0.846
Decisions 3.742 0.980
Work at home 5.369 0.930
Firm ownership
Private sector franchise 0.011 0.106
Private sector non-franchise 0.372 0.483
Alternative private sector franchise 0.011 0.104
Alternative private Sector non-franchise 0.300 0.458
Public sector 0.309 0.462
Industry
Manufacturing 0.136 0.343
Electricity, gas, and water 0.037 0.188
Construction 0.051 0.220
Wholesale and retail 0.147 0.354
Hotels and restaurants 0.058 0.234
Transport and communication 0.062 0.241
Financial services 0.046 0.210
Other business services 0.104 0.305
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negative skew for financial performance and labor productivity and a slight
positive skew for product quality. As the graphs illustrate, all three distri-
butions peak at a positive number, indicating that the typical establishment
is predicted to benefit from team production through higher labor produc-
tivity, product quality, and financial performance.14
Our main results are from Stage 3 of our analysis, and these are displayed
in Tables 3–5 for financial performance, labor productivity, and product
quality. The first and second columns of each table illustrate how EffectsA3
and A1 vary with a particular firm characteristic, holding the other char-
acteristics constant. The third column displays the difference between the
first two columns, thus answering the question of how (EffectA32EffectA1Þ
varies with a particular covariate, holding the others constant. Table 6
summarizes the qualitative results from Tables 3–5 by listing firm charac-
teristics along with the sign of their predicted effect on organizational per-
formance (i.e., the sign of DðEffectA3 EffectA1Þ). Before commenting on
the results, we note that a limitation of our analysis is that many of the
parameters underlying the predicted benefits of teams are estimated with
low precision. As a result, the confidence bands associated with the differ-
ences we report in Tables 3–5 would be fairly wide. Our results should
therefore be viewed as suggestive, and definitive statements will require
corroboration in future work with new data sets.
Table 2. (Continued )
Mean Standard Deviation
Public administration 0.084 0.277
Education 0.111 0.315
Health 0.114 0.317
Other community services 0.051 0.219
Largest occupational group at workplace
Managers and administrators 0.007 0.082
Professional occupations 0.141 0.348
Associate professional and technical occupations 0.082 0.275
Clerical and secretarial occupations 0.178 0.383
Craft and related occupations 0.105 0.307
Personal and protective service occupations 0.143 0.350
Sales occupations 0.108 0.311
Plant and machine operatives 0.127 0.333
Other occupations 0.108 0.311
Note: Statistics for financial performance are computed using the subsample of 952 establish-
ments for which financial performance is interpreted to mean profit or value added. For all
other variables, statistics are based on the full sample.
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The results concerning unions, firm size, industry, and financial partici-
pation and employee ownership are of particular interest. As seen in Table 6,
workplaces at which some employees belong to a union are predicted to lose
in all three dimensions from using teams. Having some unionized workers is
associated with a decrease of more than 7 percentage points in the prob-
ability that labor productivity is a lot above the industry average and more
than a 5 percentage point decrease in the probability that product quality is a
lot above the industry average. These changes are accompanied by increases
in the probability that performance is at or below the industry average of
more than 15 percentage points for labor productivity and nearly 7 per-
centage points for product quality. The predicted benefit of teams to finan-
cial performance is also lower in the presence of unionized workers. While
the probability that financial performance is a lot above the industry average
is actually slightly higher in unionized settings, the probability that financial
performance is average or below also increases (and by a greater amount).
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Fig. 1. (EffectA3 EffectA1) for the Financial Performance Model.Note: (EffectA3
EffectA1) is a Measure of the Degree to which a Firm Benefits in Terms of Its Financial
Performance from Team Production. EffectA3 is the Effect of Team Production
on the Probability that a Firm’s Financial Performance is a Lot Above Industry
Average, and EffectA1 is the Effect of Team Production on the Probability that a Firm’s
Financial Performance is Average or Below. The Bandwidth of 0.083 was Chosen
to Minimize the Mean-integrated Squared Error if the Data were Gaussian and a
Gaussian Kernel were Used.
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While a greater degree of union recognition (measured by the total
number of recognized unions at the workplace) is associated with benefits to
labor productivity and product quality from using teams, the reverse is true
for financial performance. This result highlights the type of misleading in-
ference that might be drawn by focusing solely on outcome measures, such
as labor productivity and product quality (both of which are common in the
empirical teams literature) rather than on broader measures such as finan-
cial performance that are more inclusive of various benefits and costs. While
labor productivity and product quality might indeed be helped by teams in
settings with high union recognition, it might be that the costs of organizing
team members are prohibitively large and overshadow the benefits.
These results concerning unions, along with the finding from Black and
Lynch (2004) that the interaction of union membership and self-managed
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
D
en
si
ty
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
Effect A3 – Effect A1
Fig. 2. (EffectA3 EffectA1) for the Labor Productivity Model. Note: (EffectA3
EffectA1) is a Measure of the Degree to which a Firm Benefits in Terms of its Labor
Productivity from Team Production. EffectA3 is the Effect of Team Production
on the Probability that a Firm’s Labor Productivity is a Lot Above Industry
Average, and EffectA1 is the Effect of Team Production on the Probability that a
Firm’s Labor Productivity is Average or Below. The Bandwidth of 0.043 was Chosen
to Minimize the Mean-integrated Squared error if the Data were Gaussian and a
Gaussian Kernel were Used.
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teams was insignificant in regressions of labor productivity, cast doubt on
the hypothesis that team production is more likely to enhance firm per-
formance in unionized settings. On the other hand, McNabb and Whitfield
(1997) found that the joint effect of union presence and teamwork on relative
financial performance is positive in their analysis of the 1990 Workplace
Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS), the predecessor of WERS. While the
McNabb and Whitfield result is counter to ours, there are some important
differences between the two studies that might account for the discrepancy.
First, the studies differ methodologically in that McNabb and Whitfield
estimate a binomial logit for financial performance whereas we estimate a
structural ordered probit in which teams and autonomy are endogenous.
Second, since the questions on teams that we use are new to the 1998 WERS,
McNabb and Whitfield used a different measure of teams. Third, we esti-
mate our financial performance model only on those establishments for
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Fig. 3. (EffectA3 EffectA1) for the Product Quality Model. Note: (EffectA3
EffectA1) is a Measure of the Degree to which a Firm Benefits in Terms of its
Product Quality from Team Production. EffectA3 is the Effect of Team Production
on the Probability that a Firm’s Product Quality is a Lot Above Industry Average,
and EffectA1 is the Effect of Team Production on the Probability that a Firm’s
Product Quality is Average or Below. The Bandwidth of 0.042 was Chosen to Min-
imize the Mean-integrated Squared Error if the data were Gaussian and a Gaussian
Kernel were Used.
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Table 3. How the Predicted Benefit of Teams on Financial Performance
Varies with Firm Characteristics.
WEffectA3 WEffectA1 W(EffectA3  EffectA1)
Basic firm characteristics
Single-establishment firm 0.036 0.073 0.108
Establishment size 0.630 0.494 1.124
Fraction of part time
workers
0.066 0.126 0.192
Temporary workers 0.009 0.030 0.039
Fixed term workers Under
one year
0.054 0.118 0.172
Fixed term workers over
one year
0.069 0.149 0.217
Union workers 0.007 0.017 0.010
Financial participation 0.053 0.068 0.121
Owner manager 0.085 0.148 0.233
Foreign owned 0.004 0.061 0.065
Operation over five years 0.053 0.126 0.179
Multi-skilling 0.029 0.050 0.080
Number of recognized
unions
0.077 0.114 0.191
Induction training 0.064 0.127 0.191
Off-site training 0.014 0.017 0.032
Just-in-time production 0.049 0.105 0.154
Information 0.029 0.038 0.067
Incentive alignment 0.040 0.059 0.098
Decisions 0.004 0.005 0.009
Work at home 0.010 0.014 0.024
Firm Ownership
Private sector franchise 0.136 0.446 0.582
Private sector non-
franchise
0.025 0.013 0.012
Alternative private sector
franchise
0.171 0.334 0.505
Alternative private sector
non-franchise
0.134 0.285 0.420
Industry
Manufacturing 0.038 0.054 0.091
Electricity, gas, and water 0.128 0.311 0.439
Construction 0.087 0.185 0.272
Hotels and restaurants 0.079 0.124 0.203
Transport and
communication
0.006 0.024 0.030
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Table 3. (Continued )
WEffectA3 WEffectA1 W(EffectA3  EffectA1)
Financial services 0.032 0.061 0.093
Other business services 0.023 0.047 0.070
Public administration 0.051 0.088 0.139
Education 0.114 0.126 0.240
Health 0.028 0.031 0.060
Other community services 0.128 0.162 0.290
Largest occupational group at workplace
Managers and
administrators
0.037 0.060 0.096
Professional occupations 0.086 0.188 0.274
Associate professional and
technical occupations
0.069 0.273 0.342
Craft and related
pccupations
0.007 0.024 0.031
Personal and protective
service occupations
0.016 0.037 0.052
Sales occupations 0.018 0.006 0.024
Plant and machine
operatives
0.058 0.102 0.160
Other occupations 0.022 0.040 0.062
Note: The omitted categories for firm ownership, industry, and largest occupational group are,
respectively, public sector, wholesale and retail, and clerical and secretarial. (EffectA3)i for
establishment i is defined as ðEffectA3Þi ¼ ProbðYi ¼ 3jTEAMSi ¼ 1Þ2ProbðYi ¼
3jTEAMSi ¼ 0Þ; which is the effect of team production on the probability that establishment
i’s financial performance is a lot above industry average. Cell entries under ‘‘WEffect A3’’
indicate how this effect varies, on average, by the firm characteristic indicated by the row title.
This is computed slightly differently according to whether the characteristic is a single dummy
variable, one dummy variable from a group of related dummies, or a continuous variable.
When characteristic X is a single dummy variable, we computed for each establishment
ðEffectA3jXi ¼ 1Þ  ðEffectA3jXi ¼ 0Þ holding all of the other characteristics at their actual
establishment levels. Then we took the average of these differences across all establishments in
the sample. When the X in question is one dummy in a group of related dummies, the com-
putation was the same as the one just described, except that the other dummies in the same
group were evaluated at 0 rather than at their observed values for each establishment. The three
groups of dummies that are considered in this way are the industry, occupation, and ownership
variables. When the X in question is continuous, the differences we computed were not between
X ¼ 1 and X ¼ 0 but rather between the 0.75 and the 0.25 quantile of X, again holding all the
characteristics of the establishment at their individual values. (EffectA1)i for establishment i is
defined as ðEffectA1Þi ¼ ProbðYi ¼ 1jTEAMSi ¼ 1Þ2ProbðYi ¼ 1jTEAMSi ¼ 0Þ; which is the
effect of team production on the probability that establishment i’s financial performance is
average or below. The ‘‘WEffectA1’’ column was computed analogously. The
‘‘4ðEffectA32EffectA1Þ’’ column is simply the difference between the first and second col-
umns and is our measure of the degree to which the predicted benefit from teams to financial
performance varies with the firm characteristic indicated by the row title. N ¼ 889:
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Table 4. How the Predicted Benefit of Teams on Labor Productivity
Varies with Firm Characteristics.
WEffectA3 WEffectA1 W(EffectA3 – EffectA1)
Basic firm characteristics
Single-establishment firm 0.006 0.013 0.019
Establishment size 0.346 0.808 1.154
Fraction of part time
workers
0.012 0.025 0.037
Temporary workers 0.003 0.007 0.010
Fixed term workers under
one year
0.005 0.010 0.015
Fixed term workers over
one year
0.071 0.163 0.234
Union workers 0.073 0.152 0.225
Financial participation 0.039 0.089 0.129
Owner manager 0.013 0.024 0.037
Foreign owned 0.013 0.024 0.037
Operation over five years 0.009 0.019 0.028
Multi-skilling 0.002 0.006 0.008
Number of recognized
unions
0.020 0.041 0.061
Induction training 0.027 0.054 0.081
Off-site training 0.047 0.095 0.143
Just-in-time production 0.006 0.011 0.017
Information 0.014 0.027 0.041
Incentive alignment 0.012 0.025 0.037
Decisions 0.004 0.008 0.011
Work at home 0.004 0.008 0.012
Firm ownership
Private sector franchise 0.158 0.486 0.644
Private sector non-
franchise
0.006 0.024 0.030
Alternative private sector
franchise
0.049 0.160 0.209
Alternative private sector
non-franchise
0.078 0.163 0.242
Industry
Manufacturing 0.004 0.008 0.012
Electricity, gas, and water 0.002 0.006 0.008
Construction 0.006 0.014 0.020
Hotels and restaurants 0.005 0.010 0.014
Transport and
communication
0.027 0.054 0.080
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Table 4. (Continued )
WEffectA3 WEffectA1 W(EffectA3 – EffectA1)
Financial services 0.008 0.018 0.026
Other business services 0.010 0.022 0.033
Public administration 0.011 0.025 0.036
Education 0.009 0.018 0.027
Health 0.000 0.001 0.001
Other community services 0.001 0.002 0.003
Largest occupational group at workplace
Managers and
administrators
0.006 0.012 0.018
Professional occupations 0.019 0.034 0.053
Associate professional and
technical occupations
0.007 0.015 0.023
Craft and related
occupations
0.013 0.025 0.037
Personal and protective
service occupations
0.001 0.001 0.002
Sales occupations 0.016 0.034 0.050
Plant and machine
operatives
0.011 0.025 0.036
Other occupations 0.010 0.021 0.031
Note: The omitted categories for firm ownership, industry, and largest occupational group are,
respectively, public sector, wholesale and retail, and clerical and secretarial. (EffectA3)i for
establishment i is defined as ðEffectA3Þi ¼ ProbðYi ¼ 3jTEAMSi ¼ 1Þ2ProbðYi ¼
3jTEAMSi ¼ 0Þ; which is the effect of team production on the probability that establishment
i’s labor productivity is a lot above industry average. Cell entries under ‘‘WEffectA3’’ indicate
how this effect varies, on average, by the firm characteristic indicated by the row title. This is
computed slightly differently according to whether the characteristic is a single dummy variable,
one dummy variable from a group of related dummies, or a continuous variable. When char-
acteristic X is a single dummy variable, we computed for each establishment ðEffectA3jXi ¼
1Þ  ðEffectA3jXi ¼ 0Þ holding all of the other characteristics at their actual establishment
levels. Then we took the average of these differences across all establishments in the sample.
When the X in question is one dummy in a group of related dummies, the computation was the
same as the one just described, except that the other dummies in the same group were evaluated
at 0 rather than at their observed values for each establishment. The three groups of dummies
that are considered in this way are the industry, occupation, and ownership variables. When the
X in question is continuous, the differences we computed were not between X ¼ 1 and X ¼ 0
but rather between the 0.75 and the 0.25 quantile of X, again holding all the characteristics of
the establishment at their individual values. (EffectA1)i for establishment i is defined as
ðEffectA1Þi ¼ ProbðYi ¼ 1jTEAMSi ¼ 1Þ2ProbðYi ¼ 1jTEAMSi ¼ 0Þ; which is the effect of
team production on the probability that establishment i’s labor productivity is average or
below. The ‘‘WEffectA1’’ column was computed analogously. The ‘‘4ðEffectA32EffectA1Þ’’
column is simply the difference between the first and second columns and is our measure of the
degree to which the predicted benefit from teams to labor productivity varies with the firm
characteristic indicated by the row title. N ¼ 1; 660:
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Table 5. How the Predicted Benefit of Teams on Products Quality
Varies with Firm Characteristics.
WEffectA3 WEffectA1 W(EffectA3 – EffectA1)
Basic firm characteristics
Single-establishment firm 0.020 0.024 0.045
Establishment size 0.230 0.531 0.761
Fraction of part time
workers
0.014 0.016 0.030
Temporary workers 0.048 0.067 0.115
Fixed term workers under
one year
0.059 0.075 0.133
Fixed term workers over
one year
0.036 0.039 0.075
Union workers 0.051 0.068 0.120
Financial participation 0.019 0.022 0.040
Owner manager 0.018 0.005 0.023
Foreign owned 0.107 0.149 0.256
Operation over five years 0.089 0.153 0.242
Multi-skilling 0.016 0.024 0.040
Number of recognized
unions
0.008 0.017 0.024
Induction training 0.012 0.021 0.033
Off-site training 0.022 0.023 0.045
Just-in-time production 0.050 0.070 0.120
Information 0.025 0.026 0.051
Incentive alignment 0.036 0.039 0.074
Decisions 0.010 0.011 0.021
Work at home 0.012 0.013 0.025
Firm ownership
Private sector franchise 0.164 0.207 0.370
Private sector non-
franchise
0.023 0.073 0.096
Alternative private sector
franchise
0.026 0.045 0.071
Alternative private sector
non-franchise
0.042 0.090 0.132
Industry
Manufacturing 0.001 0.019 0.020
Electricity, gas, and water 0.110 0.138 0.248
Construction 0.045 0.076 0.120
Hotels and restaurants 0.027 0.027 0.054
Transport and
communication
0.081 0.138 0.219
Financial services 0.081 0.117 0.198
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Table 5. (Continued )
WEffectA3 WEffectA1 W(EffectA3 – EffectA1)
Other business services 0.047 0.074 0.121
Public administration 0.097 0.134 0.231
Education 0.011 0.004 0.007
Health 0.039 0.071 0.110
Other community services 0.003 0.006 0.009
Largest occupational group at workplace
Managers and
administrators
0.022 0.019 0.041
Professional occupations 0.004 0.018 0.014
Associate professional and
technical occupations
0.057 0.067 0.124
Craft and related
occupations
0.072 0.104 0.176
Personal and protective
service occupations
0.025 0.048 0.073
Sales occupations 0.039 0.048 0.087
Plant and machine
operatives
0.026 0.020 0.046
Other occupations 0.029 0.031 0.060
Note: The omitted categories for firm ownership, industry, and largest occupational group are,
respectively, public sector, wholesale and retail, and clerical and secretarial. (EffectA3)i for
establishment i is defined as ðEffectA3Þi ¼ ProbðYi ¼ 3jTEAMSi ¼ 1Þ2ProbðYi ¼
3jTEAMSi ¼ 0Þ; which is the effect of team production on the probability that establishment
i’s product quality is a lot above industry average. Cell entries under ‘‘WEffectA3’’ indicate
how this effect varies, on average, by the firm characteristic indicated by the row title. This is
computed slightly differently according to whether the characteristic is a single dummy variable,
one dummy variable from a group of related dummies, or a continuous variable. When char-
acteristic X is a single dummy variable, we computed for each establishment ðEffectA3jXi ¼
1Þ  ðEffectA3jXi ¼ 0Þ holding all of the other characteristics at their actual establishment
levels. Then we took the average of these differences across all establishments in the sample.
When the X in question is one dummy in a group of related dummies, the computation was the
same as the one just described, except that the other dummies in the same group were evaluated
at 0 rather than at their observed values for each establishment. The three groups of dummies
that are considered in this way are the industry, occupation, and ownership variables. When the
X in question is continuous, the differences we computed were not between X ¼ 1 and X ¼ 0
but rather between the 0.75 and the 0.25 quantile of X, again holding all the characteristics of
the establishment at their individual values. (EffectA1)i for establishment i is defined as
ðEffectA1Þi ¼ ProbðYi ¼ 1jTEAMSi ¼ 1Þ2ProbðYi ¼ 1jTEAMSi ¼ 0Þ; which is the effect of
team production on the probability that establishment i’s product quality is average or below.
The ‘‘WEffectA1’’ column was computed analogously. The ‘‘4ðEffectA32EffectA1Þ’’ column
is simply the difference between the first and second columns and is our measure of the degree to
which the predicted benefit from teams to product quality varies with the firm characteristic
indicated by the row title. N ¼ 1; 839:
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Table 6. Firm Characteristics by Sign of Association with ‘‘Predicted
Benefit of Team Production on Organizational Performance’’.
Financial
Performance
Labor
Productivity
Product Quality
Basic firm characteristics
Single-establishment firm + + +
Establishment size +  
Fraction of part time
workers
+ + 
Temporary workers  + +
Fixed Term workers under
one year
+ + 
Fixed term workers over
one year
+ + +
Union workers   
Financial participation +  
Owner manager + + +
Foreign owned +  +
Operation over five years   
Multi-skilling +  
Number of recognized
unions
 + +
Induction training + + 
Off-site training +  +
Just-in-time production +  
Information + + +
Incentive alignment   
Decisions + + +
Work at home   
Firm ownership
Private sector franchise + + 
Private sector non-franchise +  
Alternative private sector
franchise
  
Alternative private sector
non-franchise
  
Industry
Manufacturing + + 
Electricity, gas, and water +  
Construction +  
Hotels and restaurants  + +
Transport and
communication
 + +
Financial services   
Other business services   
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which the respondent interprets the term financial performance as synon-
ymous with profit or value added. This restriction was not possible in the
McNabb and Whitfield analysis, since the 1990 WIRS did not ask about the
respondent’s interpretation of financial performance. This difference is po-
tentially important. For example, DeVaro (2004a) found that the estimated
effect of teams on financial performance is quite sensitive to the respondent’s
interpretation of financial performance.
Regarding firm size, we see that larger establishments experience larger
predicted benefits from teams to financial performance. However, smaller
establishments experience larger predicted benefits from teams to both labor
productivity and product quality. One interpretation of these results is that
the nature of the monitoring problem changes with the scale of the organ-
ization, such that internal monitoring by peers in the team context is rel-
atively more effective when the organization is small (so that labor
productivity is enhanced more by teams in small establishments). But in
larger establishments there is greater scope for specialization of tasks and
Table 6. (Continued )
Financial
Performance
Labor
Productivity
Product Quality
Public administration +  
Education + + +
Health +  
Other community services  + +
Largest occupational group at workplace
Managers and
administrators
 + 
Professional occupations + + 
Associate professional and
technical occupations
+  
Craft and related
occupations
 + +
Personal and protective
service occupations
  +
Sales occupations +  
Plant and machine
operatives
  
Other occupations   
Note:+/ represents the signs from Tables 3–5 of DðEffecA32EffectA1Þ; which is a measure of
the degree to which the predicted benefit, in terms of financial performance, labor productivity
or product quality, from teams varies with firm characteristics.
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also more diversity in worker information sets, implying that team members’
information sets are more likely to be non-duplicative (so that the benefits of
teams are higher). Such benefits from teams in large establishments might
outweigh the potentially higher costs of monitoring, so that on net the
benefits of teams to financial performance are increasing with establishment
size. The result concerning establishment size further highlights the dangers
of drawing inferences about the benefits of teams based on measures of
organizational outcomes that do not capture the full spectrum of benefits
and costs from teams.
Our results for financial participation suggest that establishments in
which workers receive compensation through various types of variable-pay
schemes, including profit-related pay and share ownership schemes, expe-
rience higher predicted benefits from teams to financial performance than do
establishments with less participation. This result is consistent with the
complementarity hypothesis discussed earlier. While financial participation
is associated with higher predicted benefits of teams to financial perform-
ance, it is also associated with lower predicted benefits of teams to labor
productivity and product quality. As was the case for establishment size, this
result suggests that standard outcome measures such as labor productivity
are not inclusive enough of the various benefits and costs of teams to iden-
tify the positive organizational benefits from teams that accrue in firms with
a high degree of financial participation.
All of the industry results should be interpreted relative to the reference
group of wholesale and retail. Relative to wholesale and retail, the financial
services and other business service industries have lower predicted benefits
of teams to all three measures of organizational performance, and the ed-
ucation industry has higher predicted benefits across all three measures.
Predicted benefits to financial performance and labor productivity in man-
ufacturing are higher than in wholesale in retail, which is consistent with a
significant volume of previous work in the manufacturing sector (focusing
heavily on measures of labor productivity as an organizational outcome)
that is generally supportive of positive effects of team production on firm
performance. An interesting result is that for all of the other industries, the
sign of the predicted benefits of teams is common for labor productivity and
product quality but is the opposite of that for financial performance. For
example, industries for which the predicted benefits of teams to labor pro-
ductivity and product quality are negative but the predicted benefits to
financial performance are positive include health, public administration,
construction, and electricity, gas, and water. Industries for which the pre-
dicted benefits to labor productivity and product quality are positive but the
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predicted benefits to financial performance are negative include hotels and
restaurants, transport and communication, and other community services.
In addition to the results on unions, firm size, financial participation, and
industry, some further interesting results emerge concerning the other co-
variates. We conclude this section by noting a few of these. First, the result
concerning the age of the establishment is interesting. The binary variable
‘‘operation over five years’’ is associated with lower predicted benefits of
teams to all three measures of organizational performance, suggesting that
younger firms experience larger benefits from teams. Second, the results
concerning the variables ‘‘incentive alignment’’ (i.e., employees are fully
committed to the values of the firm) and ‘‘decisions’’ (i.e., most decisions at
this workplace are made without consulting employees) are as we would
expect. That is, a greater degree of disagreement with the statement about
incentive alignment and a greater degree of agreement with the statement
about decisions is associated with lower predicted benefits of teams to all
three measures of organizational performance. Third, the results concerning
‘‘work at home’’ are intuitive as well: as the fraction of time spent working
at home during normal business hours increases, the predicted benefits of
teams to all measures of organizational performance decrease (by over 2, 1,
and 2 percentage points for financial performance, labor productivity, and
product quality, respectively), which is to be expected since frequent inter-
action and collaboration with other team members is necessarily reduced
when an employee does a significant amount of work from home.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
While a significant volume of research addresses the question of how teams
and other high-performance work practices affect organizational perform-
ance, comparatively little attention has been devoted to the question of what
types of organizations benefit from teams. Our paper has aimed to partially
address this gap. Although we report results for a large set of firm char-
acteristics, our focus has been on firm size, unions, financial participation,
and industry. A distinguishing feature of our approach is the use of struc-
tural models in which teams and autonomy are treated as endogenous de-
terminants of organizational performance. This is important because
accurate measures of the extent to which the benefits of teams to organ-
izational performance vary with organizational characteristics require ac-
curate measures of the predicted benefits of teams to organizational
performance. If the firm’s choices of teams and autonomy are treated as
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exogenous, as is common in the teams literature, then the resulting estimates
of the effects of teams and autonomy will be biased as a result of corre-
lations among the unobserved determinants of teams, autonomy, and or-
ganizational performance. As shown in DeVaro (2004b) such biases can be
quite substantial, particularly in the case of product quality.
An interesting general pattern of results that emerges from our analysis is
that while a particular firm characteristic might be associated with large
predicted benefits of teams to labor productivity and product quality, the
same firm characteristic is often associated with lower predicted benefits of
teams to financial performance. Similarly, even when a characteristic is as-
sociated with lower benefits of teams to labor productivity or product qual-
ity, it often is associated with higher benefits to financial performance. This
finding is of particular interest since financial performance is much less fre-
quently seen as an outcome variable in this literature than measures like labor
productivity or product quality. Since financial performance, as a measure of
profit, is more inclusive than these other measures of the full spectrum of
benefits and costs induced by teams, our results suggest that studies that
focus only on labor productivity and product quality might produce an in-
complete picture of the total effect of teams on firm performance.
In future research, it would be interesting to implement our structural
approach using other data sets. One possibility is to make use of the fifth
wave of the WERS when it is released. We close our discussion with a final
recommendation. While our structural models interact the ‘‘teams’’ treat-
ment with all of the firm characteristics, autonomy enters our models only as
an intercept shift. In future work with larger data sets, it would be interesting
to generalize the model by interacting autonomy with all of the firm char-
acteristics as well. This would allow two separate regressions to be run in
Stage 3, one for the ‘‘predicted benefits to organizational performance from
using autonomous teams’’ and another for the ‘‘predicted benefits to or-
ganizational performance from using non-autonomous teams.’’ Then one
could discern what types of firms would benefit more from autonomous team
production than from closely managed team production, and vice versa.
NOTES
1. It is, of course, possible to obtain variation in characteristics within the context of
a single case study if, for example, one exploits variation across multiple establish-
ments in the same firm. Ultimately, however, general inferences cannot be drawn from
analysis of only one or a handful of observations from a specialized production setting.
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2. A more commonly used outcome variable in this literature is labor productivity
(DeVaro, 2004b; Eriksson, 2003; Kato & Morishima, 2002; Black & Lynch, 2001;
Ichniowski et al., 1997; Banker, Field, Schroeder, & Sinha, 1996; Ichniowski, 1990).
Other outcome variables have also been studied, such as innovation and R&D
(Michie & Sheehan, 1999), turnover (Huselid, 1995), worker well-being and wages
(Caroli & van Reenen, 2001, Bauer & Bender, 2001), product quality (DeVaro,
2004b; Ichniowski & Shaw, 1999; Ichniowski et al., 1997; Banker et al., 1996),
worker satisfaction (Batt, 2004; Batt & Appelbaum, 1995; Godard, 2001), worker
absenteeism (Askenazy, Caroli, & Marcus, 2001) and firms’ layoff rates (Osterman,
2000). An extensive survey of the empirical literature outside the discipline of eco-
nomics concerning the effects of team production can be found in Cohen and Bailey
(1997).
3. However, recent evidence from a large, nationally representative sample of
British establishments suggests that both types of teams confer benefits of similar
magnitude to financial performance, labor productivity, and product quality
(DeVaro, 2004a,b).
4. This result does not necessarily generalize across countries. For example,
Doucouliagos and Laroche (2003) show in their meta-analysis that there is a positive
association between unions and labor productivity in the United States.
5. Batt and Appelbaum (2003) also looked at employee job satisfaction and or-
ganizational commitment as dependent variables. They found that for workers in the
network crafts and sewing machine operators’ occupations, teams significantly im-
prove job satisfaction and organizational commitment. On the other hand, for
workers in customer service occupations, this is not the case.
6. This kind of misreporting could arise if managers who adopt innovative work
practices want to believe that their organizations are doing better, thereby ration-
alizing their decision to employ those practices.
7. Consistent with this line of argument, Machin and Stewart have shown the
subjective financial performance measure in the WIRS to be a good predictor of
workplace closure.
8. The responses sum to 1,800 instead of the full 2,191 because some respondents
reported that no comparison was possible or that the relevant data were not available.
9. See DeVaro (2004a) for a discussion of the theoretical rationale for granting
teams autonomy.
10. The statistical model requires some standard identifying restrictions on the
disturbance covariance matrix. All of its diagonal elements are normalized to one.
Furthermore, both the disturbance covariances s01 and s03 are assumed to be 0. The
restrictions on the covariance matrix are weaker than those that are imposed in the
simpler ‘‘non-structural’’ approaches common to the teams’ literature. These ap-
proaches also impose (implicitly) s01 ¼ 0 and s03 ¼ 0: In addition, however, they
impose the restrictions s02 ¼ 0; s12 ¼ 0; s13 ¼ 0; and s23 ¼ 0; whereas our models
treat these as unrestricted parameters to be estimated. This issue is not discussed in
the teams literature, because with the standard approach of using a single equation
for organizational performance (with only one disturbance term in the model),
treating teams and/or autonomy as exogenous variables on the right-hand-side, all of
these assumptions are implicit rather than explicit as they are in our models. Apart
from the non-linearities introduced by the distributional assumptions, identification
of the model is facilitated by a set of exclusion restrictions on the covariates in each
equation. The specification for each equation is detailed in the appendix. More
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discussion of the exclusion restrictions and their justification on the basis of theory,
previous empirical work, and independent tests confirming that the variables appear
unimportant in the equations from which they are excluded, can be found in DeVaro
(2004a,b).
11. In the appendix, we state the formulae for computing these three effects. The
notation for these Effects ‘‘A1’’, ‘‘A2’’, and ‘‘A3’’ was introduced in DeVaro
(2004a,b). In those studies, the role of the ‘‘A’’ in the notation was to distinguish the
effects from the analogous ‘‘predicted benefits from using autonomous teams’’ (Ef-
fects B1, B2, and B3) and the ‘‘predicted benefits from using non-autonomous
teams’’ (Effects C1, C2, and C3). We do not discuss the ‘‘B’’ and ‘‘C’’ effects in the
present paper, because here we are interested in the relationships of the firm char-
acteristics to the predicted benefits from teams. In principle, we could analyze either
the ‘‘B’’ effects or the ‘‘C’’ effects like we do the ‘‘A’’ effects, though this would yield
no insights beyond those we present in the paper. The reason is that while the
structural model interacts the ‘‘teams treatment’’ with all of the covariates, the ‘‘au-
tonomy treatment’’ simply shifts the intercept. Hence, any relationships between the
covariates and the ‘‘B’’ or ‘‘C’’ effects arises because of interactions of the covariates
with ‘‘teams’’ rather than with ‘‘autonomy’’.
12. The only covariates in the model that are ‘‘continuous’’, in the usual sense, are
establishment size and the fraction of employees who work part time. However, the
model also includes several variables recorded in the survey as ordered discrete
categories. These include information, incentive alignment, and decisions (5 catego-
ries each); work at home (6 categories); multi-skilling and off-site training (7 cat-
egories each); and number of recognized unions (11 categories). To economize on the
number of parameters to be estimated, we treat each of these variables as continuous
indexes rather than creating multiple dummies for each category. In unreported
sensitivity checks, we found the same qualitative results in models that include these
variables as multiple dummies rather than as ‘‘continuous’’ indexes.
13. While a univariate measure of the predicted benefits from teams eases the
presentation of results, collapsing EffectA3 and A1 into (EffectA32EffectA1) nec-
essarily involves some loss of information, since neither EffectA3 nor EffectA1 can
be inferred from their difference. For example, suppose that one workplace has
EffectA3 ¼ 0:10 and EffectA1 ¼ 0:07; whereas another has EffectA3 ¼ 0:07 and
EffectA1 ¼ 0:10: Both are ranked the same by the criterion EffectA3 EffectA1:
However, this lost information is not particularly useful for our purposes. To see
why, consider an alternative to (EffectA3 EffectA1) that assigns greater weight to
increases in EffectA3 than to decreases in EffectA1, or vice versa. Using such an
alternative criterion, one of the two workplaces in the example could clearly be
ranked above the other in terms of predicted benefits from teams. Absent any in-
formation about the establishments’ loss functions, however, there is no clear basis
for weighting increases in EffectA3 differently from decreases in EffectA1.
14. More detailed information on the overall effects of teams (as opposed to the
interactions we focus on in this paper) can be found in DeVaro, 2004a, b. Those
analyses report magnitudes at the 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 quantiles of
(EffectA3 EffectA1) as well as the analogous information for autonomous teams
and non-autonomous teams (as opposed to teams in general). Those studies also
report all of these results from models that treat teams and autonomy as exogenous,
to determine the nature of the bias that arises when the endogeneity of teams and
autonomy is ignored.
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APPENDIX
The statistical model specifies probabilities for each of the nine possible
outcomes that a workplace might realize. Letting i index workplaces, these
potential outcomes and their probabilities are as follows:
Probability Yi ¼ TEAMSi ¼ AUTOi ¼
P1i(h) 1 1 1
P2i(h) 1 1 0
P3i(h) 2 1 1
P4i(h) 2 1 0
P5i(h) 3 1 1
P6i(h) 3 1 0
P7i(h) 1 0 Unobserved
P8i(h) 2 0 Unobserved
P9i(h) 3 0 Unobserved
Let Zij ¼ 1 if Workplace i experiences the jth outcome
¼ 0 otherwise; for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;N and j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 9
Then the likelihood function, L*, is
L ¼
YN
i¼1
Y9
j¼1
P
Zji
ji
and the log-likelihood function, L, is
L ¼
XN
i¼1
X9
j¼1
Zji log Pji
Since each of the endogenous variables is observed only discretely, each
probability of the form Pji(h) is a multiple integral of the joint density f(e0i,
e1i, e2i, e3i). Suppressing all subscripts i, the expression for P1(h) is as follows:
P1 yð Þ ¼
Z  aþX 1d1ð Þ
1
Z 1
X 2b
Z 1
X 3g
f 1; 2; 3ð Þ d3d2d1
Probabilities P2(h) to P9(h) are similarly defined.
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Formulae for Computing Effects A1, A2, A3
Each effect is a function of the Pj(h) and is computed as follows, evaluating
the expressions for Pj at the estimated values of h:
EffectA1ð Þi ¼ P1iþP2iP6
j¼1
Pji
 P7iP9
j¼7
Pji
EffectA2ð Þi ¼ P3iþP4iP6
j¼1
Pji
 P8iP9
j¼7
Pji
EffectA3ð Þi ¼ P5iþP6iP6
j¼1
Pji
 P9iP9
j¼7
Pji
Control Variables
We include the following common set of control variables in each of X1, X2,
and X3.
Single-establishment firm: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment
is either a single independent establishment not belonging to another body,
or the sole UK establishment of a foreign organization and equals 0 if the
establishment is one of a number of different establishments within a larger
organization.
Establishment size: total number of full time, part time, and temporary
workers at the establishment.
Fraction of part time workers: number of part time workers at the estab-
lishment as a fraction of establishment size.
Temporary workers: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are temporary
agency employees working at the establishment at the time of the survey and
equals 0 otherwise.
Fixed term workers under one year: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are
employees who are working on a temporary basis or have fixed-term con-
tracts for less than one year and equals 0 otherwise.
Fixed term workers over one year: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are
employees who have fixed term contracts for one year or more and equals
0 otherwise.
Union workers: dummy variable that equals 1 if any of the workers at the
establishment belong to a union and equals 0 otherwise.
Private sector franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is
a private sector company and a franchise and equals 0 otherwise.
Private sector non-franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establish-
ment is a private sector company but not a franchise and equals 0 otherwise.
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Alternative private sector franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the
establishment is an alternative private sector firm and a franchise and equals
0 otherwise.
Alternative private sector non-franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the
establishment is an alternative private sector firm but not a franchise and
equals 0 otherwise.
The following additional control variables were included in the financial
performance equation in DeVaro (2004a), and we include them in our labor
productivity and product quality models as well so that our specification is
identical across the three measures of organizational performance. A number
of these additional variables have been found to be significantly associated
with financial performance in earlier analyses of the WIRS/WERS data, for
example, union activity, (Bryson & Wilkinson, 2002); training (Collier et al.,
2004); and financial participation (McNabb & Whitfield, 1998).
Financial participation: dummy variable that equals 1 if any employees at the
workplace receive payments or dividends from any of the following variable
pay schemes (profit-related payments or bonuses, deferred profit sharing
schemes, employee share ownership schemes, individual or group perform-
ance-related schemes, other cash bonus). This variable was included in the
financial performance equation in McNabb and Whitfield (1998) and found
to be significant; their study used data from an earlier wave of the survey, so
their definition of this variable differed slightly from ours.
Owner manager: dummy variable that equals 1 if any of the controlling
owners of the workplace are actively involved in day-to-day management on
a full-time basis, and 0 otherwise. This question was only asked of private
sector workplaces for which a single individual or family has controlling
interest (meaning at least 50% ownership) over the company.
Foreign owned: dummy variable that equals 1 if workplace reports that either
of the following two statements best describes the ownership of the workplace
(predominantly foreign owned, meaning 51% or more; foreign owned/con-
trolled) and 0 if any of the following three statements is chosen (UK owned/
controlled, predominantly UK owned, meaning 51% or more; UK and for-
eign owned). This question was asked only of private sector workplaces.
Operation over five years: dummy variable that equals 1 if the workplace has
been operating at its present address for five years or more, and 0 otherwise
Multi-skilling: degree of multi-skilling at the workplace in the largest occu-
pational group. Question asks what fraction of these employees are formally
trained to be able to do jobs other than their own. Responses are: ‘‘None 0%’’
(1); ‘‘Just a few 1–19%’’ (2); ‘‘Some 20–39%’’ (3); ‘‘Around half 40–59%’’ (4);
‘‘Most 60–79%’’ (5); ‘‘Almost all 80–99%’’ (6); ‘‘All 100%’’ (7).
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Number of recognized unions: total number of recognized unions at the
workplace.
Induction training: dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a standard in-
duction program designed to introduce new employees (in the largest oc-
cupational group) to the workplace, and 0 otherwise.
Off-site training: discrete variable measuring the proportion of experienced
employees (in the largest occupational group) that have had formal off-the-job
training (away from the normal place of work, but either on or off the
premises) over the last 12 months. Responses are: ‘‘None 0%’’ (1); ‘‘Just a
few 1–19%’’ (2); ‘‘Some 20–39%’’ (3); ‘‘Around half 40–59%’’ (4); ‘‘Most
60–79%’’ (5); ‘‘Almost all 80–99%’’ (6); ‘‘All 100%’’ (7).
In the TEAMS equation, we include a dummy variable indicating whether
a just-in-time system is in operation at the establishment. Specifically, the
employer is asked ‘‘Does this workplace operate a system designed to min-
imize inventories, supplies or work-in progress? This is sometimes known as
Just-in-Time.’’ Responses are coded as 1 for yes and 0 for no.
In the autonomy equation, we include a set of four proxies for the or-
ganizational and informational structure of the establishment, the alignment
of incentives between workers and owners, and the importance to the firm of
monitoring inputs. The first three of these are qualitative measures of man-
agerial opinion. The respondent manager is asked to comment on each of a
list of statements, responding with ‘‘Strongly agree’’ (1), ‘‘Agree’’ (2), ‘‘Nei-
ther agree nor disagree’’ (3), ‘‘Disagree’’ (4), or ‘‘Strongly disagree’’ (5). The
questions of interest as determinants of team autonomy are as follows:
Information: ‘‘Those at the top are best placed to make decisions about this
workplace.’’
Incentive alignment: ‘‘Employees here are fully committed to the values of
this organization.’’
Decisions: ‘‘Most decisions at this workplace are made without consulting
employees.’’
In addition to these managerial opinion variables, as a proxy for the
importance the employer places on monitoring worker inputs, we include a
discrete variable measuring the proportion of workers at the establishment
that ever work from home during normal working hours. Responses in-
clude: ‘‘Half or more 50%+’’, ‘‘A quarter up to a half 25–49%’’, ‘‘Up to a
quarter 10–24%’’, ‘‘A small proportion 5–9%’’, ‘‘Hardly any (less than
5%)’’, or ‘‘None 0%’’.
The full specification of the exogenous variables in X1, X2, and X3 is
summarized in the following tables.
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Exogenous Variables Included in Structural Models.
FINPERi LABPRODi QUALITYi TEAMSi AUTOi
X1 X1 X1 X2 X3
Single-establishment
firm
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of part time
workers
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Temporary workers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed term workers
under one year
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed term workers
over one year
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Union workers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Private sector
franchise
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Private sector non-
franchise
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Alternative private
sector franchise
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Alternative private
sector non-
franchise
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial
participation
Yes Yes Yes
Owner manager Yes Yes Yes
Foreign owned Yes Yes Yes
Operation over five
years
Yes Yes Yes
Multi-skilling Yes Yes Yes
Number of
recognized unions
Yes Yes Yes
Induction training Yes Yes Yes
Off-site training Yes Yes Yes
Just-in-time
production
Yes
Information Yes
Incentive alignment Yes
Decisions Yes
Work at home Yes
Industry controls (12) Yes Yes
Occupation controls
(10)
Yes Yes
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Table A1. Estimates from the Structural Model for
Financial Performance.
FINPER
(TEAMS ¼ 1)
FINPER
(TEAMS ¼ 0)
TEAMS AUTO
AUTO 1.103
(0.205)
Single-establishment
firm
0.122 0.337 0.349 0.261
(0.107) (0.253) (0.160) (0.119)
Establishment size 0.006 0.047 0.028 0.009
(0.010) (0.059) (0.028) (0.010)
Fraction of part
time workers
0.231 0.136 0.479 0.248
(0.152) (0.405) (0.329) (0.229)
Temporary workers 0.165 0.244 0.251 0.291
(0.095) (0.181) (0.129) (0.132)
Fixed term workers
under one year
0.016 0.123 0.164 0.017
(0.073) (0.261) (0.135) (0.104)
Fixed term workers
over one year
0.052 0.172 0.126 0.232
(0.119) (0.371) (0.256) (0.167)
Union workers 0.103 0.203 0.078 0.057
(0.122) (0.267) (0.137) (0.117)
Financial
participation
0.207 0.068
(0.084) (0.235)
Owner manager 0.126 0.176
(0.108) (0.296)
Foreign owned 0.166 0.286
(0.099) (0.346)
Operation over five
years
0.013 0.238
(0.103) (0.285)
Multi-skilling 0.023 0.027
(0.019) (0.047)
Number of
recognized unions
0.090 0.027
(0.033) (0.112)
Induction training 0.088 0.334
(0.109) (0.232)
Off-site training 0.013 0.004
(0.015) (0.034)
Private sector
franchise
0.384 2.743 0.644 0.247
(0.364) (0.007) (1.663) (0.508)
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Private sector non-
franchise
0.070 0.293 0.180 0.235
(0.145) (0.369) (0.254) (0.243)
Alternative private
sector franchise
0.100 0.742 0.147 0.222
(0.380) (1.648) (1.091) (0.573)
Alternative private
sector non-
franchise
0.263 0.660 0.260 0.514
(0.148) (0.357) (0.260) (0.261)
Just-in-time 0.350
(0.135)
Information 0.092
(0.042)
Incentive alignment 0.261
(0.071)
Decisions 0.023
(0.048)
Work at home 0.065
(0.060)
Constant 0.746 1.050 0.691 0.559
(0.265) (0.553) (0.410) (0.526)
c 0.916
(0.081)
s 02 0.843
(17.149)
s 12 0.618
(5.656)
s 13 0.804
(0.001)
s 23 0.533
(0.038)
Note: Standard errors from the parametric bootstrap are in parentheses and are based on 75
bootstrap replications. The omitted firm ownership category is public sector. N ¼ 889:
Indicates significance at the 10% level.
Indicates significance at the 5% level.
Table A1. (Continued )
FINPER
(TEAMS ¼ 1)
FINPER
(TEAMS ¼ 0)
TEAMS AUTO
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Table A2. Estimates from the Structural Model for Labor Productivity.
LABPROD
(TEAMS ¼ 1)
LABPROD
(TEAMS ¼ 0)
TEAMS AUTO
AUTO 0.768
(0.267)
Single-
establishment
firm
0.054 0.026 0.140 0.190
(0.091) (0.298) (0.122) (0.107)
Establishment
size
0.003 0.039 0.052 0.004
(0.005) (0.073) (0.024) (0.004)
Fraction of part
time workers
0.277 0.237 0.301 0.040
(0.127) (0.328) (0.219) (0.181)
Temporary
workers
0.043 0.190 0.110 0.277
(0.073) (0.288) (0.219) (0.075)
Fixed term
workers under
one year
0.010 0.059 0.220 0.043
(0.081) (0.217) (0.103) (0.080)
Fixed term
workers over
one year
0.066 0.420 0.251 0.004
(0.082) (0.384) (0.163) (0.093)
Union workers 0.020 0.388 0.146 0.051
(0.079) (0.233) (0.103) (0.087)
Financial
participation
0.098 0.378
(0.065) (0.223)
Owner manager 0.089 0.039
(0.117) (0.322)
Foreign owned 0.079 0.165
(0.102) (0.300)
Operation over
five years
0.050 0.118
(0.098) (0.298)
Multi-skilling 0.044 0.062
(0.015) (0.040)
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Number of
recognized
unions
0.009 0.069
(0.022) (0.123)
Induction
training
0.047 0.099
(0.070) (0.248)
Off-site training 0.022 0.097
(0.016) (0.054)
Private sector
franchise
0.557 2.751 0.670 0.596
(0.278) (0.454) (1.379) (0.287)
Private sector
non-franchise
0.144 0.217 0.069 0.094
(0.099) (0.347) (0.175) (0.137)
Alternative
private sector
franchise
0.557 0.282 0.152 0.274
(0.373) (1.980) (0.414) (0.373)
Alternative
private sector
non-franchise
0.052 0.457 0.170 0.103
(0.106) (0.431) (0.183) (0.131)
Just-in-time 0.289
(0.118)
Information 0.105
(0.032)
Incentive
alignment
0.190
(0.041)
Decisions 0.059
(0.037)
Work at home 0.060
(0.046)
Constant 0.944 1.278 0.762 0.685
(0.239) (0.769) (0.284) (0.436)
c 1.168
(0.064)
Table A2. (Continued )
LABPROD
(TEAMS ¼ 1)
LABPROD
(TEAMS ¼ 0)
TEAMS AUTO
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s 02 0.046
(0.361)
s 12 0.386
(1.415)
s 13 0.496
(0.018)
s 23 0.693
(0.009)
Note: Standard errors from the parametric bootstrap are in parentheses (75 bootstrap repli-
cations). Dummies for industry and largest occupational group are also included in the
TEAMS* and AUTO* equations. The omitted firm ownership category is public sector. Sample
size is 1,660.
Indicates significance at the 10% level.
Indicates significance at the 5% level.
Table A3. Estimates from the Structural Model for Quality of Product
or Service.
QUALITY
(TEAMS ¼ 1)
QUALITY
(TEAMS ¼ 0)
TEAMS AUTO
AUTO 1.234
(0.123)
Single-
establishment
firm
0.181 0.144 0.183 0.155
(0.090) (0.173) (0.123) (0.105)
Establishment size 0.002 0.080 0.048 0.004
(0.003) (0.047) (0.020) (0.005)
Fraction of part
time workers
0.043 0.246 0.204 0.001
(0.103) (0.243) (0.189) (0.161)
Temporary workers 0.075 0.224 0.067 0.208
(0.073) (0.162) (0.095) (0.081)
Fixed term workers
under one year
0.092 0.030 0.205 0.021
(0.057) (0.171) (0.091) (0.064)
Table A2. (Continued )
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(TEAMS ¼ 1)
LABPROD
(TEAMS ¼ 0)
TEAMS AUTO
JED DEVARO AND FIDAN ANA KURTULUS52
Fixed term workers
over one year
0.014 0.224 0.242 0.059
(0.071) (0.229) (0.141) (0.099)
Union workers 0.059 0.003 0.189 0.007
(0.077) (0.168) (0.099) (0.094)
Financial
participation
0.039 0.016
(0.054) (0.147)
Owner manager 0.206 0.179
(0.103) (0.186)
Foreign owned 0.079 0.283
(0.072) (0.265)
Operation over five
years
0.037 0.388
(0.078) (0.213)
Multi-skilling 0.020 0.049
(0.018) (0.031)
Number of
recognized
unions
0.047 0.064
(0.016) (0.070)
Induction training 0.067 0.116
(0.066) (0.160)
Off-site training 0.018 0.003
(0.013) (0.034)
Private sector
franchise
0.517 0.261 0.840 0.578
(0.276) (1.206) (1.384) (0.356)
Private sector non-
franchise
0.373 0.492 0.031 0.093
(0.077) (0.259) (0.152) (0.114)
Alternative private
sector franchise
0.068 0.007 0.070 0.402
(0.279) (0.858) (0.347) (0.345)
Alternative private
sector non-
franchise
0.282 0.547 0.126 0.004
(0.094) (0.281) (0.162) (0.111)
Just-in-time 0.303
(0.086)
Information 0.071
(0.027)
Incentive alignment 0.202
(0.038)
Table A3. (Continued )
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(TEAMS ¼ 1)
QUALITY
(TEAMS ¼ 0)
TEAMS AUTO
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Decisions 0.057
(0.032)
Work at home 0.071
(0.035)
Constant 0.586 1.490 0.748 0.808
(0.185) (0.367) (0.207) (0.292)
c 1.177
(0.069)
s 02 0.719
(0.003)
s 12 0.071
(0.391)
s 13 0.741
(0.002)
s 23 0.489
(0.045)
Note: Standard errors from the parametric bootstrap are in parentheses and are based on 75
bootstrap replications. Controls for industry and establishment’s largest occupational group are
also included in the TEAMS and AUTO equations. The omitted firm ownership category is
public sector. Sample size is 1,839.
Indicates significance at the 10% level.
Indicates significance at the 5% level.
Table A3. (Continued )
QUALITY
(TEAMS ¼ 1)
QUALITY
(TEAMS ¼ 0)
TEAMS AUTO
JED DEVARO AND FIDAN ANA KURTULUS54
